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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced military 
spending lower belligerence between India and Pakistan. We begin with 
theoretical models covering the opportunity costs of conflict in terms of trade 
losses and security spending, as well as the costs of making concessions to 
rivals. Conflict between the two nations can be best understood in a 
multivariate framework where variables such as economic performance, 
integration with rest of the world, bilateral trade, military expenditure, 
population are simultaneously taken into account. Our empirical investigation 
based on time series econometrics for the period 1950-2005 with causality tests 
suggests that reduced trade, greater military expenditure, less development 
expenditure, lower levels of democracy, lower growth rates and less general 
trade openness are all conflict enhancing. Moreover, there is reverse causality 
between bilateral trade, militarization and conflict; low levels of bilateral trade 
and high militarization are conflict enhancing, equally conflict also reduces 
bilateral trade and raises militarization. We also run forecasting simulations on 
6 different VECM models. Globalization or a greater openness to international 
trade in general are more significant drivers of a liberal peace, rather than a 
common democratic political orientation suggested by the pure form of the 
democratic peace. 
Keywords 
Inter-state conflict and trade, democracy and conflict, conflict and economic 
development 
J.E.L codes: D74, F13, F15, F51.  
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ON THE COSTS OF NOT LOVING THY NEIGHBOUR  
AS THYSELF: The Trade, Democracy and Military 
Expenditure Explanations Behind India–Pakistan Rivalry1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Conflict may be motivated by factors such as historical grievances, the clash of 
civilizations (Huntingdon, 1996), or pure avarice. Outright hostility between 
states implies the absence of peaceful cooperation, manifesting itself in 
diminished inter-state commerce, which in turn could further exacerbate the 
rivalry between the same countries. In this paper we are concerned with inter-
state rivalry between India and Pakistan. Civil war, however, is the most 
dominant form of war at present; see Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 
(2006) for data, and Murshed (2002) for a theoretical overview. Despite the 
preponderance of civil war, inter-state rivalry has not withered away, and these 
too can also divert substantial amounts of resources away from poverty 
reduction in developing countries.  
International trade allows one country to peacefully benefit from the 
endowments of another nation through voluntary exchange. Furthermore, free 
trade integrates the world economy. War is another way of expropriating the 
endowments of another country, but it is costly as it destroys part of both 
countries pre-existing wealth. Predation is an alternative to production, but it is 
not usually the most efficient, as predation (war or other forms of larceny) 
unnecessarily wastes resources. Such, unenlightened behaviour may be rational 
or optimal from the standpoint of the individual person or a nation, but is 
inefficient in the global sense. The work of Francis Edgeworth, writing in the 
late 19th century, provides a useful starting point in understanding the 
economic rationale for violence. Edgeworth distinguished between consent—
and its absence—in human economic interaction: 
The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-
interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, 
according as the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by his 
actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war; the second, 
contract. [Edgeworth, 1881, pp 16-17]. 
International economic interactions between nations may involve peaceful 
trade, or it could be belligerent with reduced economic interaction. Outright 
war is just one manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the armed peace is 
equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan are a case in point. 
They have had at least four large scale military confrontations (1948, 1965, 
1971 and 1999), but otherwise spend a great deal of time in uncompromising 
posturing vis-à-vis each other. India, in particular, frequently accuses Pakistan 
of sponsoring terrorism in her territory. But occasionally they make goodwill 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank Admasu Shiferaw and Arjun Bedi for valuable comments on 
previous drafts of this paper.  
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1: Pakistan and India Hostility Levels
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gestures, such as sending out peace buses between cities like Delhi and Lahore, 
and agree to cricket tours. Less frequently, major concessions are made mainly 
by Pakistan, such as President Musharraf’s willingness to put aside the long 
standing Pakistani demand and United Nations resolution for a plebiscite to 
settle the future of Kashmir.2 Figure 1 charts the hostility levels of the two 
states on a scale of 0-6. It has never been below 2, but is usually at a high level 
of 4, which measures belligerency short of outright war.  
FIGURE 1 
Hostility between Pakistan and India 
 
TABLE 1 
The Military Burden in Selected Countries 
Countries with Conflict 
Defence 
Expenditure
(% of GDP) 
Countries without Conflict 
Defence 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
India (2004) 2.34 Canada (2004) 1.19 
Pakistan (2004) 4.14 Germany (2004) 1.38 
Egypt (2004) 2.76 Holland (2004) 1.73 
Syria (2003) 6.97 Sweden (2004) 1.73 
Israel (2004) 9.30 Argentina (2004) 1.01 
Lebanon (2003) 3.92 Mexico (2004) 0.51 
Saudi Arabia (2004) 7.70 Nicaragua (2004) 0.69 
Oman (2001) 12.16 Panama (2004) 0.97 
Yemen (1999) 5.28 Paraguay (2004) 0.70 
South Korea (2004) 2.45 Peru (2004) 1.20 
USA (2004) 3.98 Guatemala (2004) 0.40 
UK (2004) 2.57 El Salvador (2004) 0.66 
The most recent year for which data is available is given in parenthesis.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) 
                                                 
2 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3330031.stm. 
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Both countries spend a considerable amount in military expenditure, 
measured as a proportion of GDP (see table 1). In fact, these two countries 
have among the highest military burdens in the world outside the Middle East. 
One can surmise, that such large scale military expenditure detracts from 
development and poverty reduction in South Asia which has the largest 
concentration of the world’s poor, defined by below purchasing power parity 
$1 a day per-person.  
FIGURE 2 
Patterns in India-Pakistan Trade 
 
 
Polachek (1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) argue that wars and 
disputes between geographically contiguous states involve greater losses, as 
more efficient geographically proximate trade is displaced. 3 This effect, 
however, depends on the absence of alternative trading partners, who despite 
                                                 
3 When we come to comparing trade and conflict with many nations, not just dyadic 
(pair-wise) interactions, Dorussen (1999) argues that although trade reduces conflict, 
in the presence of many countries, an increase in the number of countries or the 
world’s endowment may induce more conflict, as there are more countries to grab 
from. Formally, it lowers the minimum probability of military success needed to make 
conflict worthwhile in the presence or absence of trade with the target country. Hegre 
(2002) shows that by taking ratios of the probabilities (rather than differences as in 
Dorussen, 1999) the benefits of trade rise as the number of countries increase. Thus, 
Dorussen (1999) establishes gains from conflict after globalization, whereas Hegre 
(2002) models benefits from cooperation (or trade) as globalization gathers pace. 
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greater distance may be equally or more efficient. Figure 2 shows that India-
Pakistan official trade (as a proportion of Pakistan’s total international trade) 
steadily declined from nearly 20% in the early 1950s, plummeting to almost 
zero after their war in 1965, and has shown some signs of recovery in the 
1990s. But it is still below the levels of the 1950s, which was shortly after the 
two nations were separated politically. This is despite the fact that India and 
Pakistan have fairly open economies at the present. Pakistan has traditionally 
been more open than India (Figure 2, panel 3). Pakistan also trades more with 
developing countries compared to developed countries, as shown by graph 4 in 
figure 2. Conflict and rivalry are symptomatic of the absence of cooperation 
including lower trade volumes. Equally, conflict may be said to be a 
consequence of the lack of trade. 
A related issue concerns the so-called democratic peace,4 see Polachek 
(1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) for a review of this substantial 
literature. The idea is that democracies will not fight each other because they 
share cultural norms that militate against forceful dispute resolution, or 
alternatively the checks and balances that characterise political processes in 
advanced democracies restrain violence. Put simply, the idea is that established 
democracies do not go to war with each other, but cooperate instead. The 
intellectual basis for this argument has been traced back to Immanuel Kant’s 
(1795) work on the Perpetual Peace, where a like mindedness referred to as 
cosmopolitanism would prevent outright war between republics; a tendency that 
could be reinforced by commercial interdependence. Mirroring Kant’s 
thoughts, the contemporary philosopher, John Rawl’s (1999) notion of peace 
between liberal societies or nations, arguing that liberal societies do not go to 
war with each other because their needs are satisfied, they are non-acquisitive 
in the sense of not wishing to grow beyond an achieved steady-state level of 
(presumably high) income, and they are tolerant of difference. They will only 
fight in self-defence, and invade to prevent gross human rights abuses such as 
genocide in other countries. They can, however, occasionally be duped into 
supporting foreign wars. Polachek (1997) makes a case for the alternative 
notion of the liberal peace, presenting empirical evidence to suggest that 
advanced democracies cooperate, not because of their similar political systems, 
but due to their vast and multiply intersecting economic interdependence. 
Barbieri (1996) demonstrates that the liberal peace based upon the pacific 
effects of economic interdependence may be a chimera. Oneal and Russett 
(1999) and Hegre (2000), however, argue that economic interdependence 
reinforces peace, particularly between democracies. Perhaps, we need a theory 
that embeds democracy with economic interdependence. Democracies may, 
however, go to war with other democracies that are distantly located, culturally 
disparate and considerably poorer, something that is also echoed in Kant 
(1795). Indeed, Robst, Polachek and Chang (2006) present some evidence to 
suggest that more democratic nations could exhibit some degree of 
                                                 
4 Sometimes the literature refers to this concept also as the liberal peace, which is a 
source of some confusion as some authors refer to the peace emanating from 
economic interdependence as the liberal peace.  
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belligerence to less democratic countries, such as in the case of India’s actions 
vis-à-vis Pakistan. Nevertheless, increased democratic levels can mandate 
concessions and re-negotiation with neighbours. 
The Polity score of democracy (see, Polity 4 project) ranges from 0-10. 
Similarly there is an autocracy score of between -10 to 0. Together, the 
autocracy and democracy score gives us an average score, acting as an indicator 
of the overall political system, which is graphed above. Graph 5 in figure 3 
shows that India has one of the highest democracy scores in the developing 
world for the entire 50 year period (7-9), whereas Pakistan’s experience with 
democracy fluctuates, with high autocracy scores associated with military coups 
in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999.  
FIGURE 3 
Conflict, Development and Democracy Trends in India-Pakistan 
 
 
Comparisons of graphs 2 and 3 in figure 3 indicates that military 
expenditures tend to move inversely with development (education) 
expenditure, providing prima facie evidence that large military expenditure 
crowds out development in the social sector. Pakistan’s military expenditure is 
consistently above India’s except in the mid-1960s when India had wars with 
both China and Pakistan. In Pakistan’s case, military expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP has historically been at 5%, but rising during and after its 
1965 and 1971 wars with India to as high as 8%. The average defence 
expenditure of Pakistan is 5.5% of GDP in the 1950-2005 period, whereas for 
India it is about half at 2.8% of GDP. Since the 1990s Pakistan’s military 
expenditure has been falling, and is now at a little above 4% of GDP, which 
represents a historical low. As Indian education expenditure rose to 4 % of 
GDP in the1990s, its defence expenditure fell from nearly 4% of GDP in the 
mid-1960s to less than 3% of GDP (it has rarely been below 2% of GDP). 
Pakistan’s education public expenditure is stagnating at around 2% of GDP. 
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The opportunity costs of conflict could rise when countries move to 
higher stages of economic development as they have more to lose from 
conflict, and have more resources to negotiate peaceful settlements. The 1990s 
is considered to be a golden decade for India as GDP growth rates on average 
the Indian economy grew at 5-6% annually. Pakistan has been growing at an 
average of 6% for the last 3 to 4 years. Traditionally, from the early 1960s up 
to the early 1990s, Pakistan’s was the faster growing economy of the two. Both 
countries are in the second most rapidly growing region (South Asia) in the 
world (World Development Indicators, 2006). 
There is more to India-Pakistan conflict than merely Pakistan’s political 
orientation and a comparison of bilateral economic growth rates. This is 
because of the fact that despite high growth rates and relatively high 
democracy scores in Pakistan up to 1999, conflict between the countries 
escalated in the 1990s. By contrast, the current regime in Pakistan with a strong 
military orientation (the military is highly influential and the President 
continues to be the army chief), and therefore less democratic, is making major 
unilateral concessions to India vis-à-vis their long standing disputes over 
Kashmir. Could that be related to the very recent impressive growth record in 
Pakistan? If anything, conflict between the two nations can be best understood 
in a multivariate framework where the relevant variables and processes 
(economic performance, integration with rest of the world, trade between the 
conflicting nations, military expenditure, democracy, and population) are 
simultaneously taken into account. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
whether greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced military spending 
lower belligerence between India and Pakistan. We also investigate the causal 
links between bilateral conflict and these variables in a time series framework, 
between 1950 and 2005 in most cases. The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows: section 2 contains the theoretical model, the econometric analysis is 
presented in section 3, and section 4 concludes.  
2 THEORETICAL MODEL 
This section consists of two parts: the first deals with the costs of belligerent 
behaviour in a single country context where the losses are displaced trade and 
the crowding out effects of defence expenditure; the second looks at the costs 
of peaceful behaviour where the disutility of making concessions to an 
adversary is modelled in a two country setting. The situations we model either 
pertain to limited warfare, with negligible effects on national endowments, or 
alternatively we could be said to model the costs of an armed peace associated 
with large security and military establishments. In many ways, conflict has 
similar effects as other forms of trade wars.  
2.1  Costs of War 
We begin with a single country’s decision making with regard to belligerence, 
based on Polachek (1997). The welfare of either country (U) depends upon 
consumption (E), and security (S), entering the utility function in a separable 
fashion: 
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),( SEuU =   (1) 
where: 
TMXcQE −+−=  (2) 
 Q is the total endowment of the country where a proportion c is devoted 
to private and public non-military consumption and investment; a fraction 1-c 
to a public good covering security or military expenditure. X and M denote 
exports and imports to the rival country, and T represents trade (exports minus 
imports) with the rest of the world. θ is the price of the exportable and the 
price of the importable is the numeraire good, normalised at unity. There is 
also a balance of trade constraint, the value of exports must equal imports: 
0,0)( <=+− sXTMSX Kθ  (3) 
Following Polachek (1997) let us postulate that conflict disrupts trade. 
Specifically, it lowers exports, but unlike in Polachek’s model both countries 
are hostile towards each other, and not just one country (described as the 
actor) against a passive target. So, in our model, both countries exports to each 
other will decline, along with ambiguous effects on the terms of trade. The 
country whose goods are demanded more elastically will experience the 
negative terms of trade effect. Nevertheless, exports displaced by conflict are a 
loss, as they represent foregone trade, especially in the context of neighbours 
who might be expected to trade substantially in peaceful circumstances. 
Substituting (3) as a constraint and (2) into (1) allows us to write a Lagrangian 
function (L), where λ indicates the Lagrange multiplier: 
)(])([);( SCTMSXSTMXcQuL −+−+−+−= θλ  (4) 
The function C represents the distortionary (taxation and crowding out) 
costs of security expenditure, which rises with S, so that the partial derivative is 
positive. This is an additional cost associated with security spending, absent in 
Polachek’s (1997) model. The first order condition with respect to S is: 
0,0, <>+−= ssssss XCuCXu Lλ  (5) 
In equation (5) the marginal utility of security (us) is equated to its marginal 
costs. The latter (on the right-hand side of (5)) is comprised of the trade 
disruption due to conflict, and the cost of diverting resources to military and 
security expenditure. This, last effect, is absent from the Polachek models. The 
cost of conflict is not just confined to displaced trade, but it also has a 
distortionary resource cost because of security expenditure, either because of 
distortionary taxation or due to the crowding out effect on other forms of 
investment, including government spending on health and education; see 
Deger and Sen (1990). Note, that security expenditure and benefits derived 
from confronting one’s enemy does yield positive utility, but comes at a price. 
 12
There is, therefore, an additional cost of belligerent behaviour over and above 
losses from trade displacement, and is likely to be substantial because it 
detracts from poverty reduction directly. It is worth noting that trade costs and 
losses from resource misallocation are a priori likely to be greater for the smaller 
economy, Pakistan. The same will be true of the terms of trade which are likely 
to deteriorate for Pakistan. This is because a smaller economy’s exports to its 
larger neighbour are usually a greater proportion of its total exports, its goods 
may be demanded more elastically, and the costs of an arms race are larger for 
the smaller nation. 
2.2 Costs of Peace 
If peace is Pareto optimal, why don’t countries engage in it?5 In this section we 
model the costs of peace, which include psychic non-pecuniary costs of 
making concessions to one’s adversaries. Additionally, we try to demonstrate 
how increased globalization and democratisation can help to reduce conflict by 
lowering the cost of making concessions to one’s neighbours. To analyse these 
factors we require a two country expected utility model of non-cooperative 
strategic interaction.  
The two countries: India and Pakistan are indexed by subscripts I for India 
and P for Pakistan. There are two states of nature, denoted by superscripts: 
one more peaceful or dovish (D), and the other associated with greater 
hawkishness (H). Their probabilities are defined as π and 1 - π, respectively. 
An important feature of our model is that states of conflict, or peace, are 
relative. The probability of either state is in turn affected by an action (a) by 
India and effort (e) by Pakistan. These are also the strategic variables employed 
by the two sides to the conflict. We postulate that the probability of the 
peaceful state π rises with the input of action and effort by the two sides, but at 
diminishing rates. One can imagine a range of activities by one or both sides if 
they wish to promote peace, including a greater willingness to compromise, 
reduce military expenditure, devoting more resources to peaceful economic 
development, or a greater willingness to respond to calls for peace by third-
parties such as the UN or under the influence of pressure from the United 
States.  
Actions and efforts to seek peace entail costs for each party. The costs of 
actions to promote peace could take a variety of forms, but, above all, there is 
the loss of face to either party’s hawkish domestic political constituencies, 
including the military establishment. Increased globalization may, however, 
augment the stock of rhetoric available to politicians who wish to push their 
‘peace’ agenda through the political process. Secondly, and in a more palpable 
sense, increased international trade and the growth it brings may provide the 
                                                 
5 Sir Normal Angell, winner of the 1933 Nobel peace price and former editor of 
Foreign Affairs, in his great book The Great Illusion, asserted that nations could never 
enrich themselves through war, and even a victorious nation would come off 
economically worse from a war; see Angell-Lane (1910).  
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additional resources to buy off domestic ‘war’ lobbies. A more democratic 
government, following military rule, may similarly use its mandate from the 
people to justify greater peace and reduced military expenditure.  
The expected utility of India is given by 
++= )(),( DIDIDII SEUeaU π  
))(()(),)(1( TaZSEUea HIHI
H
I −+−π  (6) 
where I
DU and I
HU denote utilities or pay-offs in dovish and hawkish states 
respectively, weighted by the probabilities of the two states. 
D
I
D
I SE + , 
H
I
H
I SE + indicate the exogenous pair of payoffs from consumption and 
security expenditure respectively in the less belligerent and more belligerent 
states respectively. The difference is that in dovish state security spending is 
lower and private consumption higher than in the hawkish state. There will 
also be more trade between the two countries. Most importantly, the dovish 
state of nature will imply greater poverty reduction. Z is the cost function of 
undertaking the action, a. Action, a, increases the probability of peace,π, 
however, undertaking it entails a cost, as described above. T indicates greater 
globalization (more trade with the rest of the world), and this is postulated to 
reduce the cost of making peace via the cost function (Z) as discussed above, 
Za1 < 0.6 Also, πa > 0, but πaa < 0; there are diminishing returns to these 
actions. Note, however, both Za > 0 and Zaa > 0.  
Turning to Pakistan, we symmetrically have 
++= )(),( DPDPDPP SEUeaU π  
)),(()(),)(1( PTeLSEUea HPHP
H
I −+−π  (7) 
L is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of peace, π. As 
with India, greater globalization lowers the marginal cost of making peaceful 
concessions, but so does a hybrid concept called increased democratisation (P) 
for Pakistan only given the nature of swings there between democratically 
elected governments and military rule; Le1 and Le2 < 0. Also, πe > 0, but πee < 0, 
Le > 0, and Lee > 0.  
In the non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash game played by the two sides 
both sides move simultaneously. Each side, therefore, maximises its own utility 
function with respect to its own choice variable. For India, it implies 
maximising utility, Equation (6), with respect to a as shown by 
                                                 
6 Increased globalization is unlikely to directly affect the marginal productivity of 
actions or efforts (a, e) that raise the probability of peace (π).  
 14
[ ] aHIDIa ZUU =⋅−⋅ )()(π  (8) 
Pakistan maximises Equation (7) with respect to e 
[ ] eHPDPe LUU =⋅−⋅ )()(π  (9) 
Note that in Equations (8) and (9) each side will equate its marginal 
benefit from exercising their own strategic choice to the corresponding 
marginal cost. Each side's strategic choices will depend on the first order 
conditions given in Equations (8) and (9), along with a fixed conjecture about 
the opposition’s strategic choice. These lead to the (linear) reaction functions 
for both sides, obtained by totally differentiating Equations (8) and (9) with 
respect to a and e. For India this is indicated by 
[ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅ ⋅−⋅+= aeHIDIae
D
I
H
Iaaaa
I
if
UU
UUZ
Rda
de ππ
π LKK
 (10)  
and for Pakistan by 
[ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅+ ⋅−⋅= aeDPHPeeee
H
P
D
Pae
P
if
UUL
UU
Rda
de ππ
π KKK
 (11) 
Note that πae = πea by symmetry.  
The reaction functions are positively sloped if πae > 0, implying that the 
two strategies are complements. This is the standard assumption in the 
literature on conflict. In our model, however, we postulate that πae < 0, the 
choice variables are strategic substitutes, and the reaction functions slope 
downwards (Figure 4). This can occur because the strategy space is defined in 
terms of peace. Thus, if one side behaves more peacefully it increases the utility 
of both parties and the other side may free ride on this action by not bringing 
about a corresponding increase in their action.  
In Figure 4, two non-cooperative equilibria are illustrated by points N and 
C respectively. Point C is more cooperative and peaceful with greater inter-
country trade and poverty reduction. A shift from N to C can occur because of 
greater globalisation (rise in T) because of, say, the establishment of a free trade 
area, and increased international (not necessarily just bilateral) trade lowers the 
marginal cost of peaceful behaviour (Za1, Le1< 0). Analytically this means a 
change in the first-order condition for India:  
[ ] dTZUU aHIDIa 1)()( =⋅−⋅π  (8') 
and for Pakistan 
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[ ] dTLUU eHPDPe 1)()( =⋅−⋅π  (9') 
This pertains to the liberal peace. Alternatively, there could be a rise in the 
exogenous pay-offs in terms of consumption expenditure (E) in (8) and (9) 
above, leading to the same outcome in figure 4.  
The costs of peaceful actions may be easier to bear when countries (in this 
case only Pakistan) are more democratic, as there may be a mandate from the 
people to engage in more poverty reduction, greater social sector spending and 
lower military expenditure. This corresponds to the democratic peace and will 
cause the first order condition for Pakistan to become:  
[ ] dPLUU eHPDPe 2)()( =⋅−⋅π  (9'') 
FIGURE 4 
Reaction Functions of India and Pakistan 
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This causes Pakistan’s reaction function to shift outwards along India’s, 
with a new equilibrium at point S. Note, however, in the new equilibrium 
(point S) India has effectively passed on some of the burden of adjustment to 
Pakistan. In fact, the level of effort exercised by Pakistan is greater than even 
in the more cooperative solution (C), but not India’s. This could be argued to 
be the case at present. As India moves closer to the United States, and with the 
latter’s global war on terror more pressure is exerted on Pakistan to make 
unilateral concessions towards India since 2001. We could even argue that 
India is free riding on Pakistan. 
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Hypotheses 
H1: Greater bilateral inter-state commerce, as well as greater multilateral trade 
with third countries lowers various forms of bilateral inter-state conflict. This 
corresponds to the liberal peace. This hypothesis follows from our theoretical 
discussion, specifically the first order conditions in (8’) and (9’), and in 
inversely from the right-hand side of (5).  
H2: More military spending as a result of increased insecurity raises conflict. 
The hegemonic power, however, may have internal conflict (India has many 
civil wars) and other neighbours to militarily confront. The marginal utility of 
security spending rises in (5), as well as in (8) and (9).  
H3: Development expenditure (such as public spending on education) should 
lower conflict, because of economic growth which enables more consumption 
in equations (4) to (9). This is also related to the increased democratisation 
hypothesis, below.  
H4: GDP growth will decrease inter-state conflict; there is more to lose from 
war. This raises the utility from consumption in (4), (6) through to (9).  
H5: Increases in dyadic democracy scores will lead to less conflict, related to 
the notion of the democratic peace. Increased democracy may lower the cost 
of concessions and compromise with former enemies, as in (9’’) above. 
3.2 Data and Methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
Since inter-state conflict involves at least two parties, it is a dyadic concept. We 
construct dyadic proxies for India-Pakistan inter-state trade, military burden, 
development expenditure, economic development and democracy to test the 
five hypotheses we have presented above. Data definitions are given in the 
appendix. 
3.2.1.1 Measuring conflict 
The literature on inter-state conflict classifies conflict data sets into two 
categories: 1) war data and 2) events data (Polachek and Seiglie, 2006). War 
data sets focus on more hostile aspects of inter-state interactions such as crises, 
wars or militarized inter-state disputes (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996). The 
 17
most comprehensive wars data set is available under the Correlates of War 
Project (COW) which has updated war data sets employed by Wright (1942), 
Richardson (1960), and Singer and Small (1972). The other major data set on 
inter-state armed conflict is hosted by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project 
(UCDP) with the collaboration of the International Peace Research Institute, 
Oslo (PRIO) and is collected on an annual basis and covers the full post-World 
War II period, 1946–2003. Events data focuses on all inter-state events and 
bilateral interactions reported in newspapers. McClelland’s (1978) World 
Events Interaction Survey (WIES) is probably the first of its kind based on 
bilateral interactions, occurring between 1966-1992, reported in New York 
Times. Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) is an extensive 
longitudinal collection of about one million daily events reported from forty 
seven newspaper sources between 1948 and1978. Since we are interested in the 
evolution of India-Pakistan conflict over a period of the last 55 years, we will 
use Uppsala/PRIO and COW inter-state war data set instead of events based 
data sets because the former data sets provide conflict data which covers most 
of the period of 55 years (1950-2005) which we have selected for our analysis. 
Events data set is not available for the entire period. Though the events data 
set captures daily observations, our macroeconomic and democracy data varies 
annually which limits the use of daily information on conflict. Secondly, as 
shown in figure 1, hostility between India and Pakistan has usually been high in 
most of last 55 years, enabling the COW data set to capture the severity of 
conflict in most years of the dispute. Greater coverage by the COW and 
Uppsala data sets, and the availability of macroeconomic and democracy data 
on an annual basis also limits the scope of using the events data sets.  
3.2.1.2 Measuring international trade 
Generally dyadic trade is captured by sum of imports and exports between 
actor and target countries (Polachek and Seglie, 2006). Figure 2 shows that in 
the last 55 years the patterns of inter-state trade between Pakistan and India 
have changed. Before trade between both countries collapsed to near zero in 
early 1970s, Pakistan was exporting more to India. Since the 1970s, Pakistan is 
importing more from its neighbour. In the 1950s, Pakistan and India’s trade 
with each other constituted a significant amount of their respective total trade. 
However, after the 1965 war, India-Pakistan trade never reached more than 2 
percent of their respective total trade levels. Till the late 1980s, India had been 
a relatively closed economy, whereas Pakistan has traditionally been more 
open. We construct two composite measures of India-Pakistan trade. They are 
Pakistan’s total trade with India as percentage of Pakistan’s total trade (Tpitp), 
and also India’s trade with Pakistan as a percentage of India’s total trade 
(Tpiti). We expect both trade proxies to be negatively related with conflict. It 
would be interesting to investigate whether trade between both countries as 
share of each countries total trade also affects the responsiveness of bilateral 
trade in conflict mitigation. If trade reduces conflict, trade with more countries 
should reduce conflict even more (Dorussen, 1999). Thus, it is important to 
investigate how more trade with the rest of the world affects India-Pakistan 
hostilities. We construct a total of 8 dyadic proxies to capture the combined 
international integration levels for both countries. Pakistan’s total trade as a 
ratio of India’s total trade (Xmpi), and its inverse, India’s total trade as a ratio 
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of Pakistan’s total trade (Xmip) are the first two indicators. If both of these 
trade proxies are negatively related with hostilities, we can conclude that any 
external trade competition does not increase bilateral rivalry between India and 
Pakistan, but instead both countries have similar trade policies or could 
integrate within regional bodies like SAARC (the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation). However, any evidence of a positive relationship 
between conflict and these two trade proxies would suggest that the 
competition in international markets has significant implications in sustaining 
their rivalry.  
3.2.1.3 Measuring military expenditure 
Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence (Polachek and 
Seglie, 2006). In the India-Pakistan case, we would like to examine how each 
county’s military expenditure/ military burden affects the dispute. Pakistan’s 
spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher than 
India’s. Additionally, since military expenditures may also capture the capability 
of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state conflict, Indian military 
expenditure can also be explained in terms of the high prevalence of 
continuing intra-state conflicts in various regions of India. Pakistan has had 
fewer civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military burden captures its 
security concerns vis-à-vis India solely. If so, dyadic variables which take the 
military burden of Pakistan as a ratio of the Indian military burden, should 
affect conflict positively and vice versa. We construct 8 different dyadic proxies 
of military burden utilizing data on military expenditures as well as military 
personnel from Correlates of Wars: 1. The log of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP as a ratio of India’s defence expenditure over GDP 
(Lmilbrd 1) 2, Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 2), 3. Log of Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure 
over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 3), 4. Log of 
India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd4). 
Note that first two proxies are the inverse of each other and are expected to 
reveal the relative sensitivity of each countries’ military expenditure to conflict. 
The last two proxies are a robustness check where military expenditure of each 
country is divided by the combined military expenditure score of both 
countries. If Lmilbrd3 is positively associated with conflict, we can substantiate 
our hypothesis for Lmilbrd1. If Pakistan’s military expenditure is more closely 
associated with their bilateral conflict, and if Indian military expenditure 
captures element of deterrence, as well as belligerence with other national and 
international rivals, then the combined military expenditures should have lower 
explanatory value than Pakistan’s military expenditure alone but the sign for 
combined military score should remain positive. We investigate the average 
effects of military expenditures by both countries on India-Pakistan rivalry by 
taking two more proxies of military burden. This is to investigate whether 
military burden has on average a conflict enhancing effect, irrespective of 
country of origin, after analyzing its country specific application for deterrence 
or belligerence. Thus we propose two further proxies: 5. the log of average of 
India’s defense expenditure over GDP and Pakistan’s defense expenditure over 
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GDP (Lmilbrd5), 6. Log of Pakistan and India’s GDP weighted average of 
defense expenditures (Lmilbrd6). The proportion of military personnel to the 
total population represents the extent of militarization in a society. Thus we 
choose two further variable specifications for military burden: 7. Log of 
Pakistan military personnel over Pakistan’s total population as a ratio of India’s 
military personnel over India’s total population (LMilppi) and 8 Log of India’s 
military personnel over India’s total population as a ratio of Pakistan’s military 
personnel over Pakistan’s total population (LMilppi).  
3.2.1.4 Measuring democracy, growth and other variables 
To capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan, we turn to the Polity IV 
project hosted by Center of International Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM). Polity IV computes a combined polity score by 
subtracting autocracy scores from the democracy scores for the corresponding 
year. The value of this Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 denotes 
the highest autocracy level, and 10 the maximum democracy score. Although 
India always takes a high positive value of 7 or above, Pakistan frequently takes 
on negative values. We construct a dyadic variable of democracy for both 
countries by combining multiplying their Polity scores, following Polachek and 
Seiglie (1969). We add 10 to each countries polity series to make the negative 
Polity values positive so that our combined democracy score may capture the 
variations in the democratization process only on a positive scale. The dyadic 
democracy variable shows values as low as 50 on the scale of 0 to 400 when 
there are high levels of political dissimilarities between Pakistan (dictatorship) 
and India (democracy), and as high as 350 when both countries are governed 
by democracies (see figure 5).  
FIGURE 5 
 Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India 
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We take the weighted average of India and Pakistan’s real GDP per capita 
growth rates (Gpi) as the dyadic proxy of economic progress for both 
countries. We constructed the series for both countries by dividing GDP at 
constant prices taken from economic surveys, and dividing it by population 
levels. The data was later tallied with GDP per capita series available at the 
World Development Indicators (2006) data set. We also constructed 4 different 
proxies of social development based on India and Pakistan’s education data7: 1. 
GDP weighted average of per capita education expenditure, 2. Mean average 
of per capita education expenditure, 3. Pakistan and India’s education 
expenditures as a ratio of Pakistan and Indian’s GDP and, 4. The average of 
Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP and India’s 
education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Note that the first two 
proxies employ per capita education expenditure and the last two proxies 
employ total education expenditure. The four education proxies are 
constructed to carry out a robustness check on the role of education in conflict 
mitigation. India and Pakistan are one of the most densely populated countries 
in the world. Pakistan has 160 million inhabitants, and India has over a billion 
citizens. In line with the earlier literature, we also take the mean average of 
both countries populations as a standardising variable in our analysis (see 
Polachek, 1997).  
3.2.2 Methodology 
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results due to 
the endogeniety problems among our variables (from trade, military spending, 
social sector expenditure and growth to conflict and vice-versa). We need to 
utilize a simultaneous equation model where potential endogenieties between 
various variables are addressed. Since our data is time series, we will use Vector 
Autoregressive model (VAR) which is an extension of univariate autoregressive 
(AR) models to capture the evolution and the interdependencies between our 
multiple time series (Sims, 1980). All variables in a VAR are treated 
symmetrically by including for each variable an equation explaining its 
evolution based on its own lags and the lags of other variables in the model. 
The number of equations in a VAR model depends upon the number of 
endogenous variables; each endogenous variable is regressed on its lagged 
value, and the lagged values of all other endogenous variables as well as any 
number of exogenous variables. This solves the problem of endogeniety 
among variables. In this sense VAR model is just a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) model with lagged variables and/or deterministic terms as 
common regressors so that the regression results for each equation can be 
interpreted in the same manner as we do for ordinary least square estimators.  
The basic −p lag vector autoregressive (VAR )(p ) model has the form 
tptpttt yyycY ε+Π++Π+Π+= −−− ......2211  (12) 
                                                 
7 There is an insufficiently long time series for public health spending data for India.  
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where c is a )1( ×n vector of constants (intercept), iΠ is a )( nn× matrix (for 
every pi ,....,1= ) and tε is a )1( ×n vector of error terms. 
A bivariate VAR(2) can be written as the following system of equations: 
tttttt yyyycy 12,2
2
2,12,1
2
1,11,2
1
2,11,1
1
1,111 ε+Π+Π+Π+Π+= −−−−  (13) 
tttttt yyyycy 22,2
2
2,22,1
2
1,21,2
1
2,21,1
1
1,222 ε+Π+Π+Π+Π+= −−−−  (14) 
The lag length p has to be determined by model selection criterion (MSC) 
because too many lagged terms will consume more degrees of freedom and 
may introduce the problem of multicollinearity. Introducing too few lags will 
lead to specification errors. One way of deciding this question is to use Akaike 
(AIC), Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) or Hannan Quinn (HQ) criteria and choose 
that model which gives the lowest values of these criteria. AIC criterion 
asymptotically overestimates the order with positive probability, whereas BIC 
and HQ criterion estimate the order consistently under general conditions if 
the true order p is less than or equal to maxp . 
After fitting a VAR we may want to know which way causalities run. One 
way to do that is by running Granger causality tests after the VAR analysis. In a 
bivariate VAR model, a variable 2y  is said to Granger-cause a variable 1y  if, 
given the past values of 1y , past values of 2y are useful for predicting 1y  
(Granger, 1969). Similarly, we can extend our analysis to test Granger-causality 
for multivariate VAR ( p ), where ),......,,( 21 ′= ntttt yyyY .  
3.2.3 Results with VAR models 
This section reports the results of the multivariate VAR regression analysis. 
Proxies for conflict, bilateral and multilateral trade, economic progress, military 
burden and social development will be treated as endogenous variables, 
whereas dyadic democracy and population will be treated as purely exogenous 
concepts. Before we carry out the regression analysis, a test for stationarity is in 
order for all dyadic variables employed in our analysis. If any of the time series 
variables are non-stationary, appropriate lags are taken to solve for 
autocorrelation. Stationarity tests are carried out by running the modified 
Dicky-Fuller t-test also known as the DF-GLS test proposed by Elliot, 
Rothenberg and Stock (1996). Table 2 provides unit root test results based on 
these criteria. 
Table 2 shows that nearly all variables have unit roots. Since our time 
series variables are stationary at levels, though with some time lags, we can use 
unrestricted VAR analysis instead of restricted VECM methodology. We can 
now proceed to VAR analysis. Our reduced form VAR model for conflict is as 
follows 
ititititititt MilTrConfConf −−−−−− +++= ,4,3,21 αααα
tttitititit PDemoGE Ε+++++ −−−− 87,6,5 αααα  (15) 
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where tConf , itTr − , itMil − , itE − , itG − , tDemo and tP depict inter-state conflict, 
bilateral or multilateral trade, military burden, education expenditure, real 
growth rate of GDP per capita, dyadic democracy score and population 
respectively; t ranges from 1950-2005 and pi ,....,1= . Here p is the optimal lag 
structure for the VAR model. it−,2α it−,3α it−,4α it−,5α and it−,6α are 
)66( × metrics (for every pi ,....,1= ). 
The model above is run for the number of fatalities, Fatal because it best 
captures the severity of the militarized conflict between the two nations. Later, 
we also employ other conflict proxies in our analysis.  
TABLE 2  
DF-GLS Unit Root Tests 
Variables  Lag length With intercept With intercept and trend 
Fatal 1 -3.528* (Ng-Perron) -3.774* (Ng-Perron) 
Volfatal 1 -4.789* (Ng-Perron) -4.844* (Ng-Perron) 
Dur 1 -4.058* (Ng-Perron) -4.233* (Ng-Perron) 
Hiact 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron) 
Hstlev 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512 (Ng-Perron)  
Cnf 1 -3.025* (Ng-Perron) -4.082* (Ng-Perron) 
Tpitp 15 -1.112*** (Ng-Perron) -1.861 (Ng-Perron) 
Tpiti 15 -3.856* (MAIC) -3.319** (Ng-Perron) 
Xmpi 2 -2.710* (Ng-Perron) -2.860*** (Ng-Perron) 
Xmip 8 -4.951* (MAIC) -4.923* (MAIC) 
Lxpi1 0  2.951** (D-Fuller)  2.951** (D-Fuller) 
Lxpi2 0 -4.769* (SIC) -4.929* (SIC) 
Lmpi1 1 -4.049* (SIC) -3.961* (SIC) 
Lmpi2 1 -4.511* (SIC) -4.382* (SIC) 
Lmilbrd1 5 -2.209** (Ng-Perron) -2.795*** (Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd2 5 -2.209**(Ng-Perron) -2.795***(Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd3 5 -1.911***(Ng-Perron) -2.686***(Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd4 5 -2.128***(Ng-Perron) -2.831***(Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd5 1 -4.735* (SIC) -4.748* (SIC) 
Lmilbrd6 0 - -4.308* (SIC) 
Lmilppi 1 -4.082* (SIC) -4.098* (SIC) 
Lmilpip 1 -4.082* (SIC) -4.098* (SIC) 
Ledupi1 1  - -5.374* (SIC) 
Ledupi2 1  - -5.478* (SIC) 
Ledupi3 1 -5.918* (SIC) -5.907* (SIC) 
Ledupi4 1 - -5.642* (SIC) 
Gpi 0 -4.256* (Ng-Perron) -4.276* (Ng-Perron) 
Demopi 7 -2.790* (Ng-Perron) -2.997* (Ng-Perron) 
Poppi 10 - -7.392* (MAIC) 
-*, ** and *** shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level 
- The Lag structure is selected through (1) Ng - Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the minimum 
Schwarz information criterion (SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion (MAIC) and (4) 
Dickey-Fuller test (D-Fuller).  
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TABLE 3a 
VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of BiLateral Trade and Military Burden 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
               
Bilateral Trade               
Tpitp (16) -0.30* -0.30* -0.32* -0..28* -0.24** -0.23** -0.22**        
Tpiti (16)        -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.83** -0.70*** -0.61*** -0.64*** 0.55*** 
Military Burdeñ ̃̃̃̃̃                
lmilbrd1 (6) 2.33***       2.02       
lmilbrd2 (6)  -2.33***       -2.02      
lmilbrd3 (6)   6.53***       6.03     
lmilbrd4 (6)    -3.45       -2.84    
lmilbrd5 (2)     6.84**       6.54**   
lmilbrd6 (1)      3.26***       3.52***  
Lmilppi(2)       -1.80        
Lmilpip(2)              1.79 
Social Development               
Ledupi1(2) -4.98 -4.98 -4.83 -5.09*** -6.35** -8.34* -6.08** -6.07*** -6.07*** -6.19*** -6.02*** -5.97** -8.35* -6.10** 
Economic Growth               
Gpi (1) -0.40* -0.40* -0.41* -0.40* -0.28* -0.35* -0.34* -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* -0.31* -0.38* -0.37* 
Exogenous Variables               
Demopi (7) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003*** -0.004*** 
Poppi (10) 0.064* 0.064* 0.063* 0.066* 0.112* 0.094* 0.076* 0.063* 0.063* 0.062* 0.064* 0.101* 0.088* 0.072* 
               
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.57 
VAR(p) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) 
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
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TABLE 3b 
VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Multilateral Trade and Military Burden 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
               
Mutilateral Trade               
Xmpi(3) -0.71 -0.71 -0.75 -0.74 -0.62 -0.77*** -0.75***        
Xmip(9)        -3.74* -3.74* -3.77* -3.74* -3.89* -2.68* -3.83* 
Military Burdeñ ̃̃̃̃̃                
lmilbrd1 (6) 0.08       -0.18       
lmilbrd2 (6)  -0.08       0.18      
lmilbrd3 (6)   0.91       0.27     
lmilbrd4 (6)    -0.58       0.50    
lmilbrd5 (2)     0.04       -0.49   
lmilbrd6 (1)      3.38**       2.26***  
Lmilppi(2)       -1.02        
Lmilpip(2)              0.92 
Social Development               
Ledupi1(2) -3.64* -3.64* -3.59* -3.69* -3.60* -8.07* -2.85* -4.73* -4.73* -4.67* -4.79* -4.44** -7.70* -4.22* 
Economic Growth               
Gpi (1) -0.37* -0.37* -0.37* -0.38* -0.37* -0.34* -0.37* -0.40* -0.40* -0.39* -0.40* -0.40* -0.36* -0.39* 
Exogenous Variables               
Demopi (7) -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* 
Poppi (10) 0.067* 0.067* 0.066* 0.067* 0.066* 0.094* 0.062* 0.083* 0.083* 0.082* 0.084* 0.078* 0.101* 0.075* 
               
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46 
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
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TABLE 3c 
VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Exports, Imports and Military Burden 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             
Mutilateral Trade             
Lxpi1(1) -4.24* -4.03* -3.96*          
Lxpi2(1)    -7.89* -7.15* -4.78*       
Lmpi1(2)       -0.36 -0.17 0.03    
Lmpi2(2)          -0.71 -0.59 -0.33 
Military Burdeñ ̃̃̃̃̃ª              
Lmilbrd3 (6) 2.19   5.84**   0.39   0.30   
Lmilbrd4(6)  -0.66   -2.34***   0.44   0.37  
lmilbrd6 (1)   3.51*   2.42***   3.19**   3.09** 
             
Social Development             
Ledupi1(2) -1.96 -2.08*** -7.13* -2.87* -2.89* -7.02* -3.97* -4.19* -8.66* -4.01* -4.13* -8.43* 
Economic Growth             
Gpi (1) -0.36* -0.36* -0.35* -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* -0.34* -0.36* -0.33* -0.34* -0.35* -0.33* 
Exogenous Variables             
Demopi (7) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.005* 
Poppi (10) 0.122* 0.120* 0.154* 0.077* 0.075* 0.103* 0.077* 0.078* 0.104* 0.074* 0.075* 0.103* 
             
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.44 
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
- ª Results for Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd5, Lmilppi and Lmilpip are also utilised and the results do not change. (See tables 3a and 3b for details) 
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TABLE 3d 
 VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Education and Multilateral Trade 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             
Social Development             
Ledupi1(2) -7.70* -7.13* -7.01*          
Ledupi2(2)    -8.17* -7.52* -7.44*       
Ledupi3(2)       -4.06*** -6.29* -5.79*    
Ledupi4(2)          -7.96* -8.93* -8.91* 
Multilateral Trade             
Xmip(8) -2.68   -2.68   -3.92***   -3.14   
Lxpi1(1)  -3.96*   -3.92*   -5.46*   -4.74*  
Lxpi2(1)   -4.78*   -4.75*   -6.35*   -5.76* 
             
Military Burdeñ ̃̃̃̃̃ª              
Lmilbrd6 (1) 2.26 3.50** 2.42*** 2.44 3.62* 2.58*** -0.96 2.02*** 0.45 0.51 2.73** 1.52 
Economic Growth             
Gpi (1) -0.36* -0.35* -0.39* -0.37* -0.36* -0.39* -0.42* -0.41* -0.45* -0.39* -0.38* -0.42* 
Exogenous Variables             
Demopi (7) -0.006* -0.003*** -0.003 -0.006* -0.004* -0.003 -0.005* -0.001 -0.001 -0.006* -0.003*** -0.002 
Poppi (10) 0.101* 0.154* 0.103 0.107* 0.158* 0.109* 0.031* 0.107* 0.038* 0.021 0.087* 0.028** 
             
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.47 0.54 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.55 0.39 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.55 0.56 
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
- ª Results for Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3, Lmilbrd4, Lmilbrd5, Lmilppi and Lmilpip are also utilised and the results do not change. (See tables 3a and 3b for details) 
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TABLE 4 
VAR Regression results for Various Measures of Conflict 
VAR Regression Equations under multiple Specifications for Conflict and Military Burden 
Volfatal Cnfpi Dur Hstlvl Hiact Variables 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (1)  (2) (3)  (1)  (2) (3)  (1)  (2) (3)  (1)  (2) (3) 
               
Mutilateral Trade               
Lxpi2 (1) -10996* -9971* -6662* -2.60* -2.48* -1.22*** -451.46** -413.04** -182.81 -6.81* -6.60* -4.07** -25.75** -25.32* -16.08*** 
                
Military Burdeñ ̃̃̃̃̃ª                
Lmilbrd3 (6) 8276*   2.91*   604.72*   5.33***   19.09   
Lmilbrd4(6)  -3352**   -1.46*   -283.85**   -2.68***   -9.98  
Lmilbrd6 (10)   3255***   0.31   -55.94   0.97   4.47 
                
Social Development               
Ledupi (2) -397.02 -435.58 -6011.6** -0.74*** -0.69 -1.48 -146.53 -130.7 -180.69 -1.56 -1.47 -3.34 -9.09*** -8.75*** -17.08 
                
Gpi (1) -517.07* -524.78* -554.46* -0.86** -0.084*** -0.09** 4.89 4.97 3.63 -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -1.28** -1.26** -1.38*** 
Exogenous Variables               
Demopi (8) 1.36 1.06 0.06 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.336*** -0.342*** -0.372*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
Poppi (11) 36.38*** 34.66*** 71.54* 0.023* 0.021* 0.027* 3.531*** 3.209*** 4.248*** 0.051** 0.048** 0.058** 0.253* 0.247* 0.295* 
                
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.51 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.37 
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan 
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
- ª Results for Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd5, Lmilppi and Lmilpip are also utilised and the results do not change. (See tables 3a and 3b for details) 
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Table 3a shows the results for bilateral trade with 8 proxies of the military 
burden we propose in section B.1. The evidence suggests that trade between 
Pakistan and India significantly decrease hostilities between both nations. 
However, the low values of it−,3α coefficients suggest that bilateral trade has a 
limited role to play in conflict mitigation. This is not surprising because we 
know from figure 2, that trade between Pakistan and India has remained very 
low, and comprises only a very small fraction of each country’s total 
international trade. Though low trade levels between both countries may very 
well be the cause of the ongoing conflict, here we do not need to worry about 
reverse causality because our VAR model takes care of potential endogeneity 
problems between Fatal and Tpitp or Tpiti. On the other hand, Lmilbrd1, 
Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3, Lmilbrd4, Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd6 all are significantly related 
with conflict especially in case of Tpitp. Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 are negatively 
related with conflict, and Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 are positively related with 
conflict. This confirms our hypothesis that Pakistan’s high military expenditure 
is a close determinant of the India-Pakistan conflict. The high values of the 
it−,4α coefficients in this case indicate that any increase in military expenditure 
by Pakistan when compared to India will be correlated with higher conflict. 
However negative signs of Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 also suggest that India’s 
military expenditure is weakly related with conflict whereas as argued Indian 
military expenditure is also directed to its domestic civil wars and security 
concerns with other states and thus in case of Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and 
Lmilbrd4 the explanatory power comes from Pakistan’s military expenditure. 
Furthermore, combined military scores in Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd5 are 
positively related with conflict and the relationship is significant for both 
proxies of bilateral trade. This result suggests that irrespective of Indian 
security concerns national or international, or Pakistan’s anxieties about Indian 
hegemony, military expenditures on average do not have deterrent effect (in 
terms of fewer fatalities), but high military expenditures by both sides show 
some evidence of an arms race. The insignificance of Lmilppi and Lmilpip may 
also indicate the transformation of contemporary conventional war tactics, in 
which military size per se has a limited role in providing strategic depth. 
However, the negative sign of Lmilppi and the positive sign of Lmilpip hints 
that higher militarization in Pakistan may very well be an outcome of the 
ongoing hostilities between two nations, as higher Pakistani military personnel 
has a deterrent effect, and the converse is true for India. Education 
expenditures Ledupi1 and growth rates Gpi are significantly related to conflict 
mitigation, and the size of coefficients suggests that the potential of spending 
on education in decreasing hostilities is quite substantial. Democracy also 
decreases the severity of conflict, but the low values of coefficients show the 
relationship is quite weak.  
Table 3b and 3c show the results for multilateral trade with various 
proxies of military burden. In combination with various proxies of multilateral 
trade the explanatory power of Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 have 
reduced as they are generally insignificant but the coefficients have also been 
reduced especially for Xmpi and Xmip. The only military burden proxy which is 
consistently significant and also comes out with the right sign is Lmilbrd6. This 
means that our conclusion about the average conflict enhancing role of military 
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expenditures has not been altered. Results in table 3b show that Xmpi is 
generally insignificant, whereas Xmip is significant in nearly all specifications. 
This is an interesting result, which suggests that higher Indian levels of trade 
integration mitigate conflict more than when Pakistani openness rises. 
However, the negative signs for both proxies confirm that greater openness in 
either country would significantly decrease conflict. Furthermore, we can also 
conclude that there is no rivalry between India and Pakistan in terms of their 
trade with rest of the world, and any competition to capture international 
market share is healthy. Table 3c shows results for average trade scores for 
both countries differentiated by exports and imports. Exports by both 
countries to rest of the world are negatively related with conflict and the 
relationship is significant at the 1% level. Also, note that the values 
of it−,3α have increased further for combined exports when compared with the 
results in table 3b, indicating that the more these two countries are able to 
export to rest of the world, the lower are the levels of bilateral conflict. The 
high coefficients of Xmpi can lead us to infer that the explanatory power for 
Xpi comes more from the Indian side. Both countries are at similar rungs on 
the technological ladder, and share the potential to export to the rest of the 
world, along with the likes of China. In contrast to exports, results on Lmpi1 
and Lmpi2 show that rising imports although do not increase hostilities as the 
signs are always negative but the overall insignificance of combined import 
scores mean imports may not exert any negative pressure on hostilities either. 
The results for education expenditure, economic performance and democracy 
remain unchanged.  
We investigate the potential of development expenditure in conflict 
mitigation in detail by employing 4 proxies of education expenditure, with 3 
different combinations of multilateral trade, while using Lmilbrd6 as a common 
proxy for military burden. The results are presented in table 3d. In contrast to 
defence expenditure, which is positively related to conflict, efforts to improve 
human capital by allocating more funds to education are a strong determinant 
of conflict mitigation as the results in table 3d demonstrate. All four proxies of 
education expenditure always enter the conflict regression equation with a 
negative sign, and are significant in all specifications. The high values of 
it−,5α indicate that channeling resources to development sector in general, and 
investment in education in particular, may go a long way in building peace. The 
weighted average of Pakistan and Indian per-capita growth rates (Gpi) are 
negatively and significantly related with Fatal in all specifications confirming 
the hypothesis that countries are more peaceful when they are moving forward 
economically. The combined democracy score (Demopi) is always negatively 
related to conflict, and also significant. However, the low values of democracy 
coefficients suggest that political orientation has played a more limited role in 
the India-Pakistan conflict. Our results also show that the high levels of 
population in both countries, where a significant proportion are uneducated 
and poor on both sides, contribute positively to the conflict, although the 
effect is small. The results on Xmip, Lxpi1 and Lxpi2 confirm yet again that 
India and Pakistan should open up further, as conflict mitigation is highly 
responsive to multilateral trade. In other words, we can conclude that a lower 
military burden would mean both countries can invest more on education, 
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higher multilateral trade combined with increased education level will seriously 
contribute to peace between Pakistan and India on a sustainable basis. Though 
democracy is also good for peace, economics clearly trumps democracy as a 
conflict mitigating factor.  
Further robustness checks, under additional specifications of the conflict 
dependent variable, are carried out on (15) with different proxies of conflict 
(i.e, Volfatal, Cnfpi, Dur, Hstlvl and Hiact). Each definition of conflict is 
regressed on Lmilbrd3, Lmilbrd4 and Lmilbrd6, whereas Lxpi2, Ledupi1, Gpi, 
Demopi and Poppi make up the common set of regressors in a total of 15 
specifications. The results are given in Table 4. They confirm the validity of all 
the 5 hypotheses proposed at start of our empirical section, and our theoretical 
model. More trade, increased education expenditure, higher GDP per capita 
growth rates, a greater democratic orientation, all exert downward pressure on 
conflict, as all of these variables are significant in most cases, and always carry 
the right signs. A comparison of coefficients suggests that integration with the 
world has by far the most dominant effect on conflict mitigation than any 
other variable. Note that in table 4 we only consider multilateral trade, and not 
bilateral India-Pakistan trade. Education spending comes second in its 
effectiveness in enhancing peace. The results in Table 4 also show that annual 
battle deaths, severity of conflict, duration of escalation, hostility levels and 
highest hostility level decrease when both countries score high on democracy. 
Again, persistently low values taken by democracy t,7α  means that political 
orientation plays a less prominent role in explaining the severity of dispute or 
levels of escalation. There is some evidence that these countries have entered 
into outright war even when both were democracies. The ‘Kargil’ war of 1999 
is a case in point. By contrast, the long military stand off between India and 
Pakistan in 2002, occurred at a time when Pakistan was highly autocratic. The 
results in the table 4 also indicate that Lmilbrd3 always enters (15) with a 
positive sign and is significant in 4 out of 5 cases. The coefficients of LMilbrd3, 
Lmilbrd4 and Lmilbrd6 are highest for Volfatal and Dur suggesting that military 
expenditures significantly increase the severity of conflict as more days of the 
year are spent in hostility and higher fatalities are borne by both sides.  
It would be interesting to run multivariate Granger causality tests to see if 
causality runs from the determinants of conflict to conflict, and whether there 
are also cases of reverse causality. We ran Granger causality test for each VAR 
specification for which we present results in tables 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d and 4. A 
summary of Granger causality tests are provided in table 5 for all endogenous 
regressors of conflict, and where there is an instance of reverse causality it is 
noted. The results in table 5 show that all regressors except Lmilppi, Lmilpip, 
Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 Granger cause conflict. We also witness some instances of 
reverse causality especially for Tpitp, Tpiti, Lmilbrd5, Lmilbrd6, Ledpi1, Ledupi2 
and Ledupi4 in case of Fatal, Lmilbrd6 in case of Volfatal, lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in 
case of Cnfpi, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Dur, Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 
in case of Hstlvl and Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Hiact.  
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TABLE 5 
Granger Causality Wald Tests 
Direction of Causality  Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC 
FatalTpitp→  (√)* (√)*** VolfatalGpi→  (√)* × 
FatalTpiti→  (√)*** (√)** CnfpiLxpi →2  (√)* × 
FatalXmpi→  (√)** × CnfpiLmilbrd →3  (√)* × 
FatalXmip→  (√)* × CnfpiLmilbrd →4  (√)* × 
FatalLxpi →1  (√)* × CnfpiLmilbrd →6  × (√)*** 
FatalLxpi →2  (√)* × CnfpiLedupi →1  (√)*** (√)*** 
FatalLmpi →1  × × CnfpiGpi→  (√)* × 
FatalLmpi →2   × × DurLxpi →2  (√)* × 
FatalLmilbrd →1  (√)** × DurLmilbrd →3  (√)* × 
FatalLmilbrd →2  (√)** × DurLmilbrd →4  (√)** × 
FatalLmilbrd →3  (√)* × DurLmilbrd →6  × (√)*** 
FatalLmilbrd →4  (√)* × DurLedupi →1  (√)* (√)* 
FatalLmilbrd →5  (√)* (√)** DurGpi→  (√)* × 
FatalLmilbrd →6  (√)* (√)* HstlvlLxpi →2  (√)* (√)* 
FatalLmilpip →  × × HstlvlLmilbrd →3  (√)*** × 
FatalLmilppi →  × × HstlvlLmilbrd →4  (√)*** × 
FatalLedupi →1  (√)* (√)* HstlvlLmilbrd →6  × (√)* 
FatalLedupi →2  (√)* (√)* HstlvlLedupi →1  × (√)* 
FatalLedupi →3  (√)* × HstlvlGpi→  (√)*** × 
FatalLedupi →4  (√)* (√)*** HiactLxpi →2  (√)** (√)*** 
FatalGpi→  (√)* × HiactLmilbrd →3  × × 
VolfatalLxpi →2  (√)* × HiactLmilbrd →4  × × 
VolfatalLmilbrd →3  (√)* × HiactLmilbrd →6  × (√)* 
VolfatalLmilbrd →4  (√)* × HiactLedupi →1  (√)*** (√)** 
VolfatalLmilbrd →6  (√)* (√)*** HiactGpi→  (√)*** × 
VolfatalLedupi →1  (√)* ×    
*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC stands for reverse causation, √ means 
causes and × means not causes 
 
The reverse causality in the India-Pakistan bilateral trade measures show 
that low levels of trade are also an outcome of India-Pakistan conflict which 
has spanned more than 50 years. Thus any decrease in hostility levels would 
also exert a positive and favourable effect on bilateral trade which would create 
fertile grounds for dispute resolution. Thus more bilateral trade through 
reduction of tariffs is a noteworthy confidence building measure. The presence 
of reverse causality in average military spending is also not a surprise. This 
means that India-Pakistan conflict is a significant cause of historically high 
military expenditures between both countries. Especially, if high levels of 
conflict between India and Pakistan lower India’s military expenditure as a 
proportion of Pakistan’s military expenditure, then Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 
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would be positively related with conflict, which is the case in table 3a, 3b, 3c 
and 4 . In the light of the results one interpretation may be that a military build 
up by Pakistan increases as a response to conflict. This may be true because of 
the dominant role of the army and high military expenditures in Pakistan are 
justified due to continuous high levels of hostility with its neighbour. 
Otherwise, Pakistan doesn’t have any major dispute with any other nation, or 
frequent instances of intra-state disputes to justify the high budget allocation 
for defense. Reduction of hostilities would thus favourably affect the military 
burden in both countries, and both India and Pakistan can have more 
resources to channel towards its development and poverty reduction strategies. 
The reverse causality from conflict to education expenditure could explain this 
process. Reverse causality between conflict measures and proxies of education 
expenditure highlight the resource constraints faced by both sides due to their 
rivalry where funds allocated to defense seem to crowd out public investment 
in development sector. We also find that there is reverse causality between 
Lxpi2 and Hstslvl and Hiact. This result highlights the economic implication of 
conflict. If hostility levels rise and conflict moves closer to outright war, it will 
strangle export capability with rest of the world for both countries. This will 
have negative effects on growth potentials also. For example one can observe 
from figure 2, section 1, that right after 1971 and 1999 wars between Pakistan 
and India, total trade shares for both countries witnessed a deep decline. 
Economic growth Granger causes conflict and the relationship is negative. The 
growth patterns of both countries are independent of conflict, as far as reverse 
causality is concerned. The relationship is highly significant at a 1% level in all 
the observed instances of table 5. These results substantiate our graphical 
analysis, where hostilities between both countries seem to go down when both 
countries are performing well on the macroeconomic front. Any slow down in 
growth rates in any of the two nations seem to be positively correlated with the 
conflict and this trend has been very much present since 1950.  
3.2.4 Results with VECM models 
Our analysis above establishes an average relationship between conflict and 
some of its identified determinants in a pure dyadic setting. We now wish to 
further analyze country specific effects in order to investigate in detail the 
potential of each country’s trade levels, military burden, development 
expenditure and economic performance in enhancing peace and mitigating 
conflict. For Pakistan, we use Pakistan’s trade share with rest of the world 
(Popen), Pakistan’s total exports to GDP ratio (Pexpg) and Pakistan’s imports to 
GDP ratio (Pimpg) as proxies of Pakistan’s multilateral trade. Pakistan’s exports 
to India (Pxi) are a proxy for bilateral trade. Pakistan’s defence expenditure as a 
percentage of its GDP (Pdg) is a proxy for the military burden, and Pedug is 
Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Similarly for 
India, we employ 3 proxies of multilateral trade namely Iopen, Iexpg and Iimpg, 1 
proxy of bilateral trade (Ixp), 1 proxy of military burden (Idg) and 1 proxy for 
education expenditure (Iedug). We will not use separate Polity scores for India 
and Pakistan, as any changes in combined democracy scores are due to 
Pakistan. Before we carry out our econometric analysis, we undertook the 
stationary test. Here note that our new variables are not a complex 
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combination of weighted proxies of dyadic nature and thus may show higher 
levels of autocorrelation because they are simple percentages of times series 
variables which are mostly capturing single country time dynamics. Achieving 
stationarity in such a series at their level may be difficult.  
TABLE 6 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
Variables  Lag length With intercept With intercept and trend 
    ∆ Fatal 1 -0.875* -0.929* 
∆ Popen 1 -0.977* -0.984* 
∆ Iopen 1 -1.192* -1.495* 
∆ Pexpg 1 -0.937* -0.965* 
∆  Iexpg 1 -0.940* -1.257* 
∆ Pimpg 1 -1.125* -1.121* 
∆ Iimpg 1 -1.321* -1.449 
∆ Pxi 1 -1.692* -1.702* 
∆ Ixp 1 -1.971* -2.328* 
∆ Pedu 1 -0.946 -1.025* 
∆ Iedu 1 -0.841* -0.879* 
∆ Pgpc 1 -1.992* -1.995* 
∆ Igpc 1 -2.292* -2.293* 
∆ Pdg 1 -1.421* -1.441* 
∆ Idg 1 -0.899* -0.877* 
∆ Pmilpop 1 -1.289* -1.292* 
∆ Imilpop 1 -0.756* -0.766* 
∆ Demopi 1 -0.982* -0.982* 
-*, ** and *** shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level 
 
 
For time series variables, it is quite possible for random walks to be related 
to each other so that a regression of one random walk on the other has a 
stationary error term. As a simple example, consider a two variable system:  
ε=∆ ty ,1 and uy t =∆ ,2  let tt yy ,2,1 + be stationary. The simplest example 
is that .,1,2 vyy tt +−=   
That is, let one random walk be the negative of the other and allowing for 
some error. Then the sum is simply a random error with no unit root or 
autocorrelation. If the combination of unit root variables is not a unit root 
then there must be some relationship between them. If there is co-integration 
then a relationship exists, if not it does not. Therefore establishing that a 
relationship exists between unit root variables is equivalent to establishing co-
integration. That relationship is called the co-integrating vector, which for our 
example is (1, 1) since the sum is stationary. There is a way to write a system 
that captures all the relationships and avoids unit roots. Consider 
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ttttt vyyy +++=∆ −− εββα )( 1,121,211,1 ,
ttttt vuyyy +++=∆ −− )( 1,121,212,2 ββα  
This is called a vector error correction model. The error correction comes 
from the co-integrating relationship. The betas contain the co-integrating 
equation and the alphas the speeds of adjustment. If ty ,1  and ty ,2  are far from 
their equilibrium relationship, either ty ,1  or ty ,2  or both must change, the 
alphas let the data choose. The vector part of the name does not apply to the 
model above, but it will if the error terms are autocorrelated.  
We ran unit root tests on the above variables and find that the unit root is 
only solved at first differences, as shown by table 6. Since at levels, nearly all 
variables have unit roots, there should be at least one co-integrating 
relationship for our analysis to move forward. In other words, we can no more 
use unrestricted VAR analysis but need to under take Vector Error Correction 
Methodology (VECM) which is only a restricted VAR, where we first find the 
presence of the number of co-integration equations in each VECM 
specification and then run the regression analysis. As mentioned above, VECM 
also allows us to have a rich set of information among variables including their 
short and long-term adjustment dynamics and thus provides more 
comprehensive insights into the relationship among variables than an 
unrestricted VAR would do.  
The three reduced form VECM equations for Conflict would be as 
follows then: 
++++= −−−−−−−− ititititititititt PdgItrPtrConfConf ,4,3,2,111 ( ββββα  
t
y
ityatititit CDemoIdg 1
6
1
,,6,5 ) Ε+++ ∑
=
−−−− ββ  (16) 
++++= −−−−−−−− ititititititititt PdgIeduPeduConfConf ,10,9,8,722 ( ββββα
t
y
itybtititit CDemoIdg 2
6
1
,,12,11 ) Ε+++ ∑
=
−−−− ββ   (17) 
++++= −−−−−−−− ititititititititt PdgIgpcPgpcConfConf ,16,15,14,1333 ( ββββα  
t
y
ityctititit CDemoIdg 3
6
1
,,18,17 ) Ε+++ ∑
=
−−−− ββ  (18) 
Here, s'β show the co-integration relationship for each variable under 
investigation for each equation, and the s'α show the adjustment parameters. 
sC' are the constant terms for each six variables on the right hand side of each 
VECM equation, and s'Ε are the respective error terms. As mentioned, the 
general openness indicator, total export shares, total import shares and exports 
to the other country of conflict for both India and Pakistan are utilized as 4 
separate single country proxies of trade. Thus there are 4 separate 
specifications for equation (16). This makes total number of VECM 
specification rise to 6.  
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TABLE 7 
VECM Regression Results for Fatal: 
VECM Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Trade, Education and Growth 
VECM 1 VECM 2 VECM 3 VECM 4 VECM 5 VECM 6 Variables 
α  β  α  β  α  β  α  β  α  β  α  β  
             
Fatal -0.92* 1 -0.80* 1 -0.87* 1 -0.96* 1 0.70* 1 0.05 1 
Popen 0.27 0.15*           
Iopen 0.39* -0.38*           
Pexpg   0.28*** 0.15         
Iexpg   0.11** -0.36***         
Pimpg     -0.02 0.30*       
Iimpg     0.29* -0.85*       
Pxi       4.51 -0.007     
Ixp       2.20 -0.015*     
Pedu         -0.02 2.27*   
Iedu         -0.002 -1.53*   
Pgpc           -0.11** 2.18* 
Igpc           -0.37* 2.57* 
Pdg -0.027 0.034 -0.081 0.52* 0.031 -0.25 0.048 -0.024 -0.082 0.84* 0.02 2.62* 
Idg 0.009 -0.866* -0.017 -0.32 0.030 -1.35* 0.002 -0.031 -0.006 -0.84** 0.002 -2.04 
Demopi 
17.83* 
-
0.003**
* 
17.8* -0.004** 14.73** -0.002 14.76** 
-
0.0004 19.11 -0.008* 2.42* 
-
0.017**
* 
(MaximumVEC Rank)º (1) º (1) º (1) º (1) º (1)º (4) º 
N 53 53 53 45 53 52 
R2 0.53 0.57 0.48 0.52 0.42 0.04 
VEC(p) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) VEC(1) 
--*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, ∆ denotes values first difference 
-Here α  captures adjustment coefficients for a co-integration equation and β  are parameters for each variable in a co-integration equation. ºVEC Rank shows the maximum number of co-
integration equations for each VECM model significant at 5%. - VEC(p) reports lag-order for each VECM model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) 
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Graph 1d (VECM 4)
0
2
4
6
20
25
30
35
40
20
22
24
26
1
2
3
4
5
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
2003 2003.5 2004 2003 2003.5 2004 2003 2003.5 2004
Forecast for fatal Forecast for popen Forecast for iopen
Forecast for pdg Forecast for idg Forecast for demopi
95% CI forecast
Graph 1a (VECM 1)
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Graph 1b (VECM 2)
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Graph 1c (VECM 3)
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Graph 1e (VECM 5)
0
2
4
6
8
-5
0
5
10
-5
0
5
10
2
3
4
5
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
2003 2003.5 2004 2003 2003.5 2004 2003 2003.5 2004
Forecast for fatal Forecast for pgpc Forecast for igpc
Forecast for pdg Forecast for idg Forecast for demopi
95% CI forecast
Graph 1f (VECM 6)
FIGURE 7 
 Forecasting Simulations based on VECMs for Fatal 
 
 
The results for each VECM equation are presented in table 7. The lag 
length for each VEC equation is (1), based on final prediction error (FPE), 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). There is one 
co-integrating equation in each VECM, confirming the robustness of the 
model specification. Note, that optimal value of conflict is zero in the long run, 
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meaning that our conflict measure, Fatal takes the value of 0. The results for 
VECM 1 show that Fatal takes a negative value, and Popen and Iopen positive 
values. This means that in the short-term both Pakistan and Indian trade shares 
are negatively related with Fatal. However, only Indian trade is significant 
enough to exert a negative pressure on hostilities in the short-term adjustment 
period. In the long run both Pakistan’s and Indian trade shares with rest of the 
world will adjust by moving in opposite directions. In the long run Pakistan 
would witness a rise in its trade with the outside world and Indian trade would 
decline to its optimal level. The long-term net result on the trade share of both 
countries is expected to be positive as trade would be at higher levels with 
peace than without peace. The long-term rise in Pakistan’s trade shares in order 
to adjust to a fall in hostility levels also mean that the negative effects of India-
Pakistan conflict have thwarted Pakistan’s capacity to trade in international 
markets more than in India’ case. Results on VECM 2 suggest that in short-
term both exports by India and Pakistan would rise to adjust to any fall in 
conflict. However, in the long run Pakistani exports would remain unchanged, 
whereas Indian exports will adjust downwards. Similar short-term adjustment 
dynamics for imports are observed for India in VECM 3. However in the long 
run Pakistan’s imports would rise as conflict moves to its optimal value of 0, 
whereas imports by India will adjust downwards. The above discussion suggest 
that Pakistan’s trading capability has been seriously hampered by the conflict 
between both nations despite the fact Pakistan has been historically more open 
economy when compared to India. As far as Indian trade with the outside 
world is concerned, in the short-term it is destined to rise further especially if 
hostilities with Pakistan abate. However, the long run trade share would adjust 
downwards unless India follows a more open trade policy and further reduce 
its tariffs to levels similar to its neighbour.  
Bilateral trade would also respond to increased peace as shown by the 
results of VECM 4. In the short-term there is a sign of increase in bilateral 
trade between India and Pakistan, but the increase is not significant meaning 
trade between India and Pakistan would remain low. However in the long run 
Indian exports to Pakistan would go down to reach an optimal level. This is an 
important finding. Some in Pakistan fear that peace initiatives like reducing 
tariffs for Indian goods would mean greater dependency on Indian produce. 
Taking into account the historically high hostility levels between two countries, 
any peace initiative or confidence building measure which leads to more 
market access to India is viewed with scepticism in Pakistan, as many fear that 
dependence on India may expose Pakistan to unnecessary pressures from 
India, and vulnerable to one sided solutions to the Kashmir dispute. Our 
results show that in the long run the dependency on Indian cheap goods would 
actually decline, and both countries would end up being equal trading partners. 
Thus more bilateral trade, far from creating any power imbalance between 
India and Pakistan, would equally distribute the gains. Pakistan may fulfil its 
import needs more from the other developing countries such as China. The 
results for VECM 5 suggest that education expenditure would increase in the 
short-term to reduce conflict, and as conflict falls to its optimal level, Pakistan 
would be able to simultaneously put more resources in education sector. High 
growth rates also adjust positively to decrease hostility levels and in the long 
run as the hostilities fall, both countries also witness a strong positive effect on 
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their growth rates. This means that peace would put India and especially 
Pakistan on higher growth paths on a sustainable basis.  
The results for the military burden show that in the short-term military 
expenditure would continue to remain at high levels. However, in the long run, 
as hostilities decline, Indian military expenditure would fall. However, 
Pakistan’s military spending would adjust upward with declining trends in 
hostility.8 In the short-term there is also evidence of higher democracy scores 
as hostilities fall, but low values of the s'β show that conflict mitigation is 
quite weakly related to conflict.  
In order to further check the conclusions drawn from our VECM results 
in table 7, we generated 6 different forecast schedules from 6 co-integrating 
VECMs as a simulation exercise to predict how conflict would be affected to 
changes in its determinants. Note that the data on Fatal are only up to 2002. 
Thus the one year forecasts are generated for Fatal for 2003 period. Figure 7 
shows the forecast graphs. Graph 1a, 1b and 1c suggest that if military 
expenditures by both countries would remain at its current high levels, along 
with trade with the outside world at their 2002 levels, a slight deterioration in 
democracy scores will have a significant effect on the rise in hostility. However, 
if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a check on any 
rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to some average 
level. Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities. Current low levels of 
bilateral trade between Pakistan and India is conflict enhancing so more trade 
with increased exports by both sides to each other should be encouraged. More 
access to Pakistani markets on the Indian side may not lead to conflict 
mitigation if Pakistan is not able to also export more to India. A rise in 
education expenditure puts a check on hostilities as seen in Graph 1e. Graph 
1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict, and best fits 
historical trends. The forecasts suggest that conflict will rise, even if there is a 
significant increase in combined democracy scores, if growth rates plummet. 
Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years, when hostilities between 
both countries rose significantly when at least one of the countries is 
performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as a 
proportion of their GDPs. The forecasts favour the liberal peace over 
democratic peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between both 
countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front 
and channeling fewer resources on military as a proportion of national income, 
while at the same time having a divergent set of political institutions.  
                                                 
8 We have also run VECM regressions military personnel of each country as a proxy 
of military burden. The results show that in the short to long-term there is a 
significant decline in military personnel by Pakistani side, indicating lower levels of 
militarization in the country. Thus high military spending by Pakistani side despite 
decreasing hostility may indicate procurement of high end technology military 
imports. Growth rates would rise as hostilities fall, Pakistan may have more resources 
to channel to not only its development sector but also spend more to increase the 
efficiency of its armed forces.  
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
Conflict between India and Pakistan, which spans over most of last 60 years 
since their independence from British rule, has significantly hampered bilateral 
trade between the two nations. However, we also find that the converse is also 
true; more trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict and any 
measures to improve the bilateral trade share is a considerable confidence 
building measure. In the short term, greater Indian access to Pakistani markets 
will help decrease hostilities between the two countries; whereas in the long 
run as the peace is achieved, both countries could be exporting more to each 
other. Lately, there has been a high demand of cheaper Indian raw materials in 
Pakistani industries. A regional trade agreement along the lines of a South 
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) could enable freer access to the 
markets of member countries, and has a high potential for the improvement of 
relations between India and Pakistan on a long term basis. Pakistan and India’s 
degree of openness to world trade is the dominant economic factor in conflict 
resolution. One would imagine that in the counterfactual case of significant 
mutual inward investment, that too would also decrease mutual belligerent 
tendencies.  
Some of our results may appear to suggest that Pakistan’s relative military 
expenditure is conflict enhancing, whereas Indian relative military expenditure 
has a deterrent effect on conflict. This result, however, needs to be interpreted 
with caution. It does not necessarily mean that Pakistan is the principal actor 
initiating inter-state conflict with India. Rather it means that India, the regional 
hegemon, has other domestic and international concerns to which its defence 
spending is targeted, besides its disputes with Pakistan. India, for example, has 
unilaterally massed troops on Pakistan’s borders in 1951 and 2002. Indeed, 
there is some reverse causality between some of the military proxies and 
conflict suggesting that Pakistan’s military build ups may be more reactive. 
Overall military expenditures are still at high levels in both countries and are 
diverting scarce resources away from social development spending, such as on 
education, and poverty reduction. Education spending has been shown to be 
good for both peace and economic progress.  
In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy between pairs of nation 
should reduce inter-state hostility according to the democratic peace 
hypothesis; this relationship in our case is present but weak. Peace initiatives, it 
should be remembered, are not the sole prerogative of democracies; they can 
also be made by countries which are less than perfectly democratic out of 
economic self-interest. Pakistan, at present, is making unilateral concessions on 
many disputed issues with India. Our findings, however, veer towards the 
liberal peace hypothesis. Economic progress and poverty reduction combined 
with greater openness to international trade in general are more significant 
drivers of peace between nations like India and Pakistan, rather than the 
independent contribution of a common democratic polity. So it is more 
economic interdependence rather than politics which is likely to contribute 
towards peaceful relations between India and Pakistan in the near future. In 
many ways, our results for an individual dyad echo Polcahek’s (1997) work 
across several dyads, where it is argued that democracies cooperate not because 
they have common political systems, but because their economies are 
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intricately and intensively interdependent. As pointed by Hegre (2000), it is at 
these higher stages of economic development that the contribution of 
common democratic values to peace becomes more salient. Meaningful 
democracy cannot truly function where poverty is acute and endemic, even in 
ostensible democracies such as India. In the final analysis, it may be that 
democracy itself is an endogenous by-product of increased general prosperity, 
as suggested nearly half a century ago by Lipset (1960). Then and only then, 
will nations be able to fully comprehend Angell-Lanes’ (1910) arguments 
regarding the futility of inter-state conflict.  
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DATA AND SOURCES 
Single Country Variables 
Idg: India’s Defence Expenditure as a %age India’s GDP at current market prices, 
Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World 
Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book 2006 (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
Iedug: India’s education expenditure as a %age of India’s GDP at current market 
prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Indian Economic Survey, Education Statistics 
(Department of Education, India) and Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank) 
Iexpg: India’s total exports as a percentage of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Source: 
Indian Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Ig: Annual growth rate of India’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at 
constant prices, Years: 1950-2005, Source: Indian Economic Survey  
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Igpc: India’s real per capita growth rate: Years: 1950-2005, Source: Indian Economic 
Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF), World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
Iimpg: India’s total imports as a percentage of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: Indian Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Imilopop: India’s number of military personnel as a percentage of Indi’s total 
population. Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, 
Faten et al (2004), International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Iopen: India’s exports plus imports as a %age India’s GDP at current market prices, 
Years: 1950-2005, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Ixp: Indian exports to Pakistan, Years: 1960-2005, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF 
P2i: Polity 2 Score for India, numeric range from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high 
democracy), Years: 1950-2003, Source: Polity IV Project (Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management) 
P2p: Polity 2 Score for Pakistan, numeric range from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high 
democracy), Years: 1950-2003, Source: Polity IV Project (Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management) 
Pedug: Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP at current 
market prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey and 
Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank) 
Pexpg: Pakistan’s exports as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Pdg: Pakistan’s Defence Expenditure as a percentage Pakistan’s GDP at current 
market prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, 
World Development Indicators (2006), Government Finance Statistics Year 
Book 2006 (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
Pg: Annual growth rate of Pakistan’s GDP per capita at constant prices, Years: 1950-
2005, Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 
Pgpc: Pakistan’s real GDP per capita Growth rates, Years: 1950-2005, Source: 
International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF), Pakistan Economic Survey 
Pimpg: Pakistan’s imports as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Pmilpop: Pakistan’s number of military personnel as a percentage of Pakistan’s total 
population. Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, 
Faten et al (2004), International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Popen: Pakistan’s exports plus imports as a percentage Pakistan’s gross domestic 
product at current prices, Years: 1950-2005, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Pxi: Pakistan’s exports to India, Years: 1960-2005, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF 
Dyadic Variables 
Cnfpi: Intensity of Conflict between Pakistan and India, Scores 1 (Minor) when 25 to 
999 battle-related deaths and 2 (War) when at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a 
given year, Years: 1950-2003, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data set Version 
IV, Harbom et al (2006) 
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Demopi: Pakistan and India’s combine democracy score (by adding 10 to India and 
Pakistan’s Polity2 values for each year and then taking the product of these 
values in order to covert the variable in dyadic form), Years; 1950-2003 
Dur: Number of days a conflict lasts in a year between Pakistan and India, Years: 
1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al (2004).  
Fatal: Annual fatality level of conflict between Pakistan and India, scores from 0 to 6 
0 None 
1 1-25 Deaths 
2 26-100 Deaths 
3 101-250 Deaths 
4 251-500 Deaths 
5 501-999 Deaths 
6 6>999 Deaths 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al 
(2004) 
Gpi: Weighted average of real GDP per capita growth rates for Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950 to 2005. Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Indian Economic 
Survey, International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Hiact: Highest action by Pakistan and India in annual corresponding dispute 
[bracketed numbers refer to corresponding hostility level] 
0 No militarised action [1] 
1 Threat to use force [2] 
2 Threat to blockade 
3 Threat to occupy territory [2] 
4 Threat to declare war [2] 
5 Threat to use CBR weapons [2] 
6 Threat to join war 
7 Show of force [3] 
8 Alert [3] 
9 Nuclear alert [3] 
10 Mobilisation [3] 
11 Fortify border [3] 
12 Border violation [3] 
13 Blockade [4] 
14 Occupation of territory [4] 
15 Seizure [4] 
16 Attack [4] 
17 Clash [4] 
18 Declaration of war [4] 
19 Use of CBR weapons [5] 
20 Begin inter-state war [5] 
21 Join inter-state war [5] 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al 
(2004) 
Hstlev: Annual hostility levels reached by India and Pakistan in each annual 
corresponding dispute 
1 No militarised action 
2 Threat to use force 
3 Display of force 
4 Use of force 
5 War 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Faten et al (2004) 
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Ledupi1: Log GDP weighted average of India and Pakistan’s per capita education 
expenditures, Years: 1950 to 2005 Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Indian 
Economic Survey, Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank), International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Ledupi2: Log mean average of India and Pakistan’s per capita education 
expenditures, Years: 1950 to 2005 Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Indian 
Economic Survey, Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank), International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Ledupi3: Log of Pakistan plus India’s education expenditures as a ration of Pakistan 
plus India’s GDPs, Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Indian Economic 
Survey, Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank), International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF) 
Ledupi4: Log of average of Pakistan’s education expenditure over GDP plus India’s 
education expenditure over GDP, Years: 1950 to 2005, Sources: Pakistan 
Economic Survey, Indian Economic Survey, Education Statistics 2006 (World 
Bank), International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Lmilbrd1: Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of 
India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: 
Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 
(World Bank), Government Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic 
Survey of Pakistan  
Lmilbrd2: Log of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: 
Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 
(World Bank), Government Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic 
Survey of Pakistan  
Lmilbrd 3: Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), 
Government Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of 
Pakistan  
Lmilbrd 4: Log of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), 
Government Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of 
Pakistan  
Lmilbrd5: Log of Mean average of India’s defence expenditure over GDP and 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates 
of war data set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), 
Government Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of 
Pakistan  
Lmilbrd6: Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s defence expenditures, 
Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World 
Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF), Economic Survey of Pakistan, Economic Survey of India 
Lmilppi: Log of Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total population as a 
ratio of India’s military personnel over India’s total population, Years: 1950-2001, 
Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
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Lmilpip: Log of India’s military personnel over India’s total population as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total population. Years: 1950-2001, 
Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Lmpi1: Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total imports, Years: 
1950-2005, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Lmpi2: Log mean average of Pakistan’s total imports as a proportion of Pakistan’s 
GDP and India’s total imports as a ratio of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Lxpi1: Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total exports, Years: 1950-
2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Lxpi2: Log mean average of Pakistan’s total exports over Pakistan’s GDP and India’s 
total exports over India’s GDP. Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Poppi: Average of Pakistan’s total population and India’s total population, Years: 
1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Tpitp: Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade, 
Years: 1950-2001, Source: Direction of Trade Statistics yearbook, IMF 
International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Tpiti: Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India as a ratio of India’s total trade, Years: 
1950-2001, Source: Direction of Trade Statistics yearbook, IMF International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Xmpi: Pakistan’s total trade (exports + imports) as a ratio of India’s Total trade 
(exports + imports), Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF) 
Xmip: India’s total trade (exports + imports) as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade 
(exports + imports). Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF) 
VolFatal: Precise volume of fatality in each annual corresponding dispute, Years: 
1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02 (Faten et al, 2004), 
CSCW/PRIO Battle Deaths data (Lacina, 2005), CSP Data set on Major 
Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2006 
http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm 
 
